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Abstract
We consider Nash equilibria in 2-player random games
and analyze a simple Las Vegas algorithm for finding an
equilibrium. The algorithm is combinatorial and always
finds a Nash equilibrium; on m× n payoff matrices, it runs
in timeO(m2n log logn+n2m log logm) with high proba-
bility. Our main tool is a polytope formulation of equilibria.
1 Introduction
The complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium in a 2-
player game is perhaps the outstanding open problem in
algorithmic game theory [28]. In a 2-player game, the
first player, namely Alice, has m pure strategies S =
{σ1, σ2 . . . , σm} while the second player, namely Bob, has
n pure strategies T = {τ1, τ2 . . . , τn}. We are given two
payoff matrices A and B for Alice and Bob, respectively.
Here, the ijth entry of A is the payoff to Alice when she
plays σi and Bob plays τj . A Nash equilibrium is a pair
of mixed strategies (probability distributions) x, y such that
given x, the distribution y on T maximizes xTBy, the pay-
off to Bob and simultaneously, given y, the distribution x
on S maximizes xTAy, the payoff to Alice.
On the one hand, it is easy to check that a given pair of
mixed strategies forms an equilibrium. On the other hand,
the best algorithms for finding a Nash equilibrium of an ar-
bitrary 2-player game have exponential complexity. More-
over, there is some evidence that finding an equilibrium is
unlikely to be NP-hard [26, 27]. Determining the complex-
ity of finding equilibria has lead to much research in a vari-
ety of directions, e.g., a quasi-polynomial-time algorithm to
find an approximate Nash equilibrium due to Lipton et al.
[22]; an investigation into the complexity of finding pure
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strategy Nash equilibria in succinctly specified games by
Fabrikant et al. [14]; a polynomial-time algorithm of Pa-
padimitriou and Roughgarden for finding Nash equilibria
in multi-player symmetric game in which each player has
a small number of strategies [30]; a proof that the Lemke-
Howson algorithm takes exponential time with all possible
initial pivots [32].
In this paper, we consider 2-player games where the two
payoff matrices are chosen randomly. Our motivation is the
question of whether finding Nash equilibria is any easier in
random games compared to general games, that is, easier
“on average”. In a random game, every entry in each of the
matrices is drawn independently according to some proba-
bility distribution. We consider the uniform distribution on
an interval and the standard Normal distribution N(0, 1).
In the first case, the distribution of any set of k entries of a
payoff matrix is uniform in a k-dimensional cube, while in
the second case it is a k-dimensional Normal. In fact, there
has been much work in this direction for a special case of
2-player games, the zero-sum case. This case is equivalent
to linear programming. Motivated by the question of ex-
plaining the success of the simplex algorithm, Borgwardt
[7], Smale [34] and Megiddo [25] studied linear programs
where the constraints are chosen randomly from spherically
symmetric distributions and showed that variants of the sim-
plex algorithm run in polynomial time. Besides simplex,
other simple methods (e.g., the perceptron algorithm) also
work for random linear programs, demonstrating that they
have considerably more structure than arbitrary linear pro-
grams.
Here we show random games are indeed much simpler
than general games. Specifically, we show that with high
probability, there is a Nash equilibria in which the supports
of the mixed strategies of both players have small cardinal-
ity. We remark that in a random game the supports of each
player will have the same cardinality in a Nash equilibrium.
As a result, the following naive heuristic is a Las Vegas al-
gorithm for finding Nash equilibria: exhaustively check for
Nash equilibria with supports of cardinality i = 1, 2, . . .
until an equilibrium is found. In fact, with high probability
only two phases will be required!
The key to our result is a reformulation of the problem
1
in terms of random polytopes. For convenience, we will as-
sume that m = n. We will see in Section 2 that, given a
mixed strategy for Alice (Bob), the supports of a best re-
sponse strategy for Bob (Alice) are precisely those supports
that induce facets with non-negative normal vectors in an
associated random polytope. Consequently, the algorithmic
problem of finding Nash equilibria can be tackled by con-
sidering problems relating to the number of points on the
convex hull of a set of n random points in d dimensions. In
Section 3 we extend analysis of such random polytopes for
our purpose. This allows us to examine the quality of our
algorithm in Section 4. In particular, consider the convex
hull of n random points in d dimensions. Let N1 denote
the expected number of points that lie on the boundary of
the convex hull (this will differ for the Normal and uniform
distributions). Then, our main theorem can be stated as fol-
lows.
Theorem 1. The probability that a random game contains
no Nash equilibria with supports of size at most d is less
than
f(d)
(
1
n
+
1
(N1)2
)
where f(d) is a function of d alone.
It is known that N1 grows as a function of n for both
the distributions we consider and so we get our algorithmic
result as a corollary.
Corollary 1. There is a combinatorial algorithm that finds
a Nash equilibrium in a random game and, with high prob-
ability, runs in time O(n3 log logn).
In related work, McLennan and Berg [24] have studied
the expected number of Nash equilibria for certain random
games. Finally, we remark that extending our work to al-
low matrix entries to have arbitrary means would give a
polynomial-time randomized algorithm for finding approx-
imate Nash equilibria in arbitrary games.
2 A Geometric Interpretation of Nash Equi-
libria
We begin by showing how Nash equilibria are closely re-
lated to random polytopes. For any subset of Alice’s strate-
gies, S ⊆ S, with |S| = d, let BS = {bS1 , . . . , bSn} be the
set of subcolumns of B induced by S, i.e., whose entries
correspond to the rows of S. We will view the elements of
BS as points in Rd, and denote by conv(BS) the polytope
corresponding to the convex hull of these points. Similarly
AT is the set of subrows of A induced by T ⊆ T .
Lemma 1. A point x ∈ BS is a best response to some mixed
strategy ν with support S if and only if x maximizes ν · y
among all points y ∈ conv(BS).
Proof. Any mixed strategy λ for Bob induces a point y ∈
conv(BS) where y(λ) =
∑n
i=1 λib
S
i . The expected payoff
to Bob of the mixed strategy λ is then just ν · y.
We will say that a facet of the polytope is useful if its
normal vector is nonnegative. Similarly a face of any di-
mension is called useful if it is contained in some useful
facet. Our interest in useful facets comes from the fact that
only nonnegative vectors induce feasible mixed strategies.
In particular, we obtain from Lemma 1 the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 2. Let S = {σ1, . . . , σd} and ν ≥ 0. Then
ν/||ν||1 is a mixed strategy on S for Alice, and the ver-
tices of the face in conv(BS) with normal ν ≥ 0 are best
response strategies for Bob.
Next, consider subsets S ⊆ S, T ⊆ T that are sup-
ports of mixed strategies that form a Nash equilibrium. Let
BS(T ) be the set of vectors in BS that correspond to T , and
let AT (S) be the set of vectors in AT that correspond to the
rows of S. To induce a Nash equilibrium, we need that each
x ∈ BS(T ) is a best response to some mixed strategy ν
with support S, and each y ∈ AT (S) is a best response to
some mixed strategy λ with support T . In other words, the
points in AT (S) lie on a useful facet of conv(AT ) and the
points in BS(T ) lie on a useful facet of conv(BS). Since
the entries of A and B are chosen at random, the corre-
sponding point sets will be in general position and so for a
Nash equilibrium, we must have |S| = |T |.
So Nash equilibria in random games are closely related
to the polytopes produced by random points. In particular,
we need to study the faces of random polytopes. Towards
this end, let Ni be the expected number of faces of dimen-
sion i−1 induced by conv(P) where P is a set of n random
points (N1 is number vertices, Nd number of facets). Again,
since the points are in general position any such face is in-
duced by exactly i points. We have the following simple
relationship between number of faces of a given dimension
and the number of points on the convex hull.
Lemma 2. The number of faces of conv(P) of dimension
s is at least 1s+1
(
d−1
s
)
times the number of points on the
convex hull.
Proof. Every vertex of the convex hull is contained in at
least d facets. Take a vertex x and consider any d facets
containing x. These induce a set of
(
d−1
s
)
faces of dimen-
sion s that contain x. The union of these sets may contain at
most d copies of any face. Moreover, as all the points are in
general position, every s-dimensional face contains exactly
s+1 points. Thus, summing over all vertices, we obtain the
result.
It follows that Ns+1 ≥ 1s+1
(
d−1
s
)
N1. Our interest is in
the expected number of useful faces of dimension i − 1,
denoted N+i . We will use the following notation. We write
A . B if there is a fixed function f(d), of the dimension
d alone, such that A ≤ f(d)B. We will need the simple
observation that N+s & N+1 & N1/2d.
3 Random Polytopes under Gaussian and
Uniform Distributions
In this section we present the main technical results we
will need for analysing our Las Vegas algorithm. First we
need to develop some understanding of the behaviour of Ni.
There has already been a large amount of work studying Ni
for various distributions; for a rather comprehensive survey
see [39]. We begin with two basic results regarding the uni-
form and Normal distributions, respectively.
Theorem 2. [12] Given n points drawn independently and
uniformly from a d-dimensional unit cube, the expected
number of points on the convex hull is & (logn)d−1.
Theorem 3. [31] Given n points in Rd with coordinates
drawn independently from N(0, 1), the expected number of
points on the convex hull is & (log n) 12 (d−1).
We will be be interested in the following more general
question. Let P = {x1, . . . , xn} be a set of i.i.d. random
points from a distribution with density function f . Let F be
the set of subsets of points that induces facets of conv(P),
and let Y1 and Y2 be two subsets ofX . What is the probabil-
ity that both Y1 and Y2 induce facets, i.e., P(Y1, Y2 ∈ F )?
The probability that one subset Y1 induces a facet is well-
understood for many important distributions, including the
Gaussian and the cube. We prove the following refinements
(that may be of independent interest).
Lemma 3. Suppose f is the Normal density or the uniform
density over a cube. If Y1, Y2 are disjoint subsets of P , then
P(Y1, Y2 ∈ F ) . P(Y1 ∈ F )2
Lemma 4. Suppose f is the Normal density or the uniform
density over a cube. If Y1, Y2 are subsets of P with |Y1 ∩
Y2| > 0, then
P(Y1, Y2 ∈ F ) . P(Y1 ∈ F )
2
P(Y1 ∩ Y2 is a face of conv(P))
The proof of these lemmas for the Normal distribution
can be carried out directly using the density function. We
give such a proof of Lemma 3 at the end of this section (the
proof of Lemma 4 is similar). For a cube, however, things
are more complicated and we will use an economic cap-
covering [6]. The next theorem is implied by the results of
[4].
Theorem 4. AssumeK is a convex body in Rd, vol(K) = 1
and 0 < ε < ε0(d) where ε0(d) is a constant depending
only on d. LetK(ε) denote the set of points from K that can
be cut off by a cap of volume ε. Then there are convex sets
C1, . . . , Cm and pairwise disjoint convex sets C′1, . . . , C′m
such that C′i ⊂ Ci for every i such that every cap of volume
ε is contained in one of the Ci and, further,
m⋃
1
C′i ⊂ K(ε) ⊂
m⋃
1
Ci
vol(C′i) & ε and vol(Ci) . ε.
The meaning is that K(ε) can be economically covered,
that is, covered without much overlap, by the sets Ci where
each Ci has volume a constant times ε. This implies that
vol(K(ε)) ∼ mε. The extra condition that each cap of vol-
ume ε is contained in one of theCi will be very useful when
estimating an integral in the proof of Lemma 5.
When K is the unit cube, the sets Ci will be axis-parallel
dyadic boxes:
d∏
1
[0, 2−fi ]
with integers fi ≥ 0 summing to f and 2−f ≈ ε. This is
only the covering near a single vertex, the origin, of the unit
cube, which is extended to a complete covering using the
symmetries of the cube in the obvious way. One can define
cap coverings for other distributions as well, replacing the
volume of each setCi by its measure. Such a covering exists
for the Normal distribution if the complement of a suitably
large ball is deleted.
We will use cap coverings to prove the following gener-
alization of Lemma 4. We focus now on the case whenK is
the unit cube, but the proof applies whenever a cap covering
exists.
Lemma 5. Let S, S∗, T, T ∗ be sets of cardinality d with
S ∩ S∗ = X , T ∩ T ∗ = Y , |X | = s > 0, |Y | = t > 0.
We denote by K = Q|S∪S∗| ⊂ R2d−s the unit cube
in R2d−s. Assume x1, . . . , xn are uniform, independent,
random points from K . Assume T = {x1, . . . , xd} and
T ∗ = {x1, . . . , xt, xd+1, . . . , x2d−t}. Let F(S) denote the
facets of the convex hull of the xis projected onto RS, and
similarly for F(S∗). Then,
P[T ∈ F(S) and T ∗ ∈ F(S∗)] . (lnn)
2d−s−1
n2d−t
.
Proof. Let P = {x1, . . . , xn} as before. It follows from
the main theorem in [5] that the random polytope conv(P)
contains K(c(lnn)/n) with probability at least 1 − n−3d
if the constant c is chosen large enough. Note that if T ∈
F(S), then T is a face of the convex hull of conv(P) as
well.
We fix a cap covering Mf given by Theorem 4 for ev-
ery large enough f for the unit cube. We write L|S and
L|S∗ for the projection of a set L ⊂ R|S∪S∗| onto R|S| and
R|S
∗|
, resp. We need a special minimal cap C(T ) of K that
contains T : namely, writing C(T |S) for the minimal cap
containing T |S in Q|S| we let
C(T ) = C(T |S)×Q|S∗\S|.
Similarly,
C(T ∗) = C(T ∗|S∗)×Q|S\S∗|.
Note that both C(T ) and C(T ∗) are caps of K and C(T )∩
C(T ∗) is non-empty. This implies that C(T )∩C(T ∗) con-
tains a vertex of K .
Let χ[E] be the indicator of the event E. Define D to
be the event that C(T ) ∩ C(T ∗) contains the origin. Now,
writing P for the probability in the Lemma, we have
P =
∫
K
. . .
∫
K
χ[T ∈ F(S)]χ[T ∗ ∈ F(S∗)]dx1 . . . dxn
≤ 2d
∫
K
. . .
∫
K
χ[D]×
× χ[T ∈ F(S)]χ[T ∗ ∈ F(S∗)]dx1 . . . dxn.
By the remark at the beginning of this proof we can restrict
integration to the subset where vol(C(T )) ≤ c(lnn)/n and
the same for C(T ∗). With this we only lose n−3d in proba-
bility. We replace this restricted integral by a double sum in
the following way.
Given x1, . . . , xd and C(T ) with 0 ∈ C(T ), let f be the
largest integer with C(T ) ⊂ Cf for some Cf ∈ Mf where
Mf is the cap covering for ε = 2−f . Of course, the Cf that
matters is of the form ∏
i∈S∪S∗
[0, 2−fi ]
with fi = 0 when i ∈ S∗ \ S. Let M1f be the set of these
elements of Mf . Obviously, vol(C(T )) ≥ c(d)2−f with a
suitable small c(d) > 0, and similarly for C(T ∗). Analo-
gously, we get a C∗g from Mg for each C(T ∗), and the ones
that matter are collected in M2g ⊂Mg.
We integrate then on each Cf ∈ M1f and C∗g ∈ M2g for
f, g ≥ f0. Assuming g ≥ f , the integrand is at most
(1−c(d)2−f)n−(2d−t)(vol(Cf )vol(C∗g ))d−t(vol(Cf∩C∗g ))t
since x1, . . . , xt come from Cf ∩ C∗g , xt+1, . . . , xd from
Cf , and xd+1, . . . , x2d−t from C∗g , while the rest of the xi
come from K \ C(T ). Summing this for all g ≥ f ≥ f0,
and all Cf ∈M1f , all C∗g ∈M2g we are lead to the sum∑
f≥f0
∑
g≥f
exp{−c(d)2−fn/2}2−f(d−t)2−g(d−t)Sf,g
where
Sf,g =
∑
M1
f
∑
M2g
(vol(Cf ∩C∗g ))t
Now Cf ∩ C∗g is an axis-parallel dyadic box in K , so for
some h ≥ g, it is equal to a unique Ch ∈ Mh. Conse-
quently,
Sf,g ≤
∑
h≥g
2−ht
∑
Ch∈Mh
N(f, g)
where N(f, g) is the number of pairs Cf andC∗g with Ch =
Cf ∩C∗g . For a fixed Ch, it is not hard to see that N(f, g) .
(2h− f − g + 1)s. Further, |Mh| ≈ h2d−s−1. Thus
Sf,g .
∑
h≥g
2−hth2d−s−1(2h− g − f + 1)s.
The rest is a computation: one shows first that Sf,g is
dominated by the term when h = g. (This is done by com-
paring the h+ 1st and hth terms.) Then the next sum
∑
g≥f exp{−c(d)2−fn/2}2−f(d−t)2−g(d−t)Sf,g
.
∑
g≥f [exp{−c(d)2−fn/2}2−f(d−t)
×2−g(d−t)2−gtg2d−s−1(g − f + 1)s]
is again dominated by the term when g = f (again by com-
paring consecutive terms), implying that
P .
∑
f≥f0
exp{−c(d)2−fn/2}2−f(2d−t)f2d−s−1.
Finally, the last sum is dominated by the term when 2−f =
1/n. (For f with 2−f < 1/n this is done by comparing
consecutive terms, again. For f with 2−f > 1/n the factor
exp{−c(d)2−fn/2} is very small except for finitely many
terms.) So we have
P .
(lnn)2d−s−1
n2d−t
.
Remark 1. This method works when T ∩ T ∗ = ∅. Then
(vol(Cf ∩ C∗g ))t = 1 since t = 0 and Mh does not appear
at all. With a similar computation one could prove Claim 1
(see later) in the following form:
P[T ∈ F(S) and T ∗ ∈ F(S∗)]
. P[T ∈ F(S)]P[T ∗ ∈ F(S∗)].
Remark 2. For general convex bodies the outcome depends
on Sf,g and then on N(f, g). For smooth convex bodies
N(f, g) is a constant, and the computation is simpler.
We now give a more direct proof of Lemma 3 for the
case of the Normal distribution.
Proof. We prove the lemma directly for the Normal density.
We write
P(Y1, Y2 ∈ F )
=
∫
x1,...xn∈Rd
χ[Y1 ∈ F ]χ[Y2 ∈ F ] df(x1) · · · df(xn)
Assume that Y1 = {x1, . . . , xd}, Y2 = {xd+1, . . . , x2d}
For a subset Y , let H(Y ) be the hyperplane spanning Y
and V (Y ) be measure of the distribution in the halfspace
bounded by this hyperplane not containing the origin. Then
the above probability can be bounded as
P(Y1, Y2 ∈ F ) (1)
≤ 2
∫
x1,...,x2d,V (Y2)≥V (Y1)
(1− V (Y1))n−2d df(x1) · · · df(x2d)
We now estimate this when f is the standard Normal
density in Rd. Clearly, V (Y1) depends only on the dis-
tance of H(Y1) from the origin. So, it will be convenient to
parametrize in terms of hyperplanes, and positions on them.
This is achieved by the Blaschke-Petkantschin formula. For
a spherically symmetric density function f we have,
∫
x1,...,xd∈Rd
g(x1, . . . , xd) df(x1) · · · df(xd)
= ∆(d)
∫
H:(d-1)-flat
∫
x1,...,xd∈H
g(x1, . . . , xd)dfH(x1) · · ·dfH(xd)dµ(H).
Here ∆(d) is a function of d alone and dµ(H) is the mea-
sure induced on (d−1)-flats determined by picking d points
from f . By spherical symmetry, dµ(H) = dhdu where
u is a unit vector (normal to H) and h is the distance of
H from the origin. For the Normal density, the measure
of a random point on a flat is determined by its position
on the flat and the distance of the flat to the origin, i.e.,
dfH(x1) = dfh(x1). The integrand on the RHS of (1)
depends only on the distance of H(Y1) from the origin.
Thus, applying the formula twice, once for xd+1, . . . , x2d
and then for x1, . . . , xd, we have∫
x1,...,x2d,V (Y2)≥V (Y1)
(1 − V (Y1))n−2d df(x1) . . . df(x2d)
= ∆(d)2
∫
t1≤t2
(1 − V (t1))n−2d dν(t1)dν(t2)
≤ ∆(d)
2
vol(Sd)
2
(2pi)d
∫
t1
(1− V (t1))n−2de−dt
2
1t
2(d−1)
1 dt1
≤ ∆(d)
2
vol(Sd)
2
(2pi)d
∫
t
(
1− e
− 1
2
t2
2
√
2pit
)n−2d
e−dt
2
t2d−2 dt
. n−2d(lnn)d−1
Since
P(Y1 ∈ F ) & (lnn)
(d−1)/2(
n
d
)
the lemma follows for the Normal density.
4 A Las Vegas Algorithm
We now have the tools needed to analyse our very simple
algorithm. Recall that the algorithm exhaustively checks for
Nash equilibria with supports of size 1, then for Nash equi-
libria with supports of size 2, etc., until we find a Nash equi-
librium. There are
(
n
d
)2 pairs of supports of size d and de-
termining whether a pair of supports induce a Nash equilib-
rium can be done in polynomial-time via a linear program.
Thus, provided that our game has a Nash equilibrium in-
duced by supports of constant size, we obtain a polynomial
time algorithm. We will show that with high probability, a
random game has a 2× 2 equilibrium.
More generally, we consider the probability that there is
no d × d Nash equilibrium in a random game. Let S and
T be strategy subsets of Alice and Bob respectively, where
|S| = |T | = d. We let F(T ) = {S1, S2, . . . , Sp} the set of
facets of the polytope conv(AT ) with nonnegative normal
vectors (here E(p) = N+d ); each Si corresponds to the set of
rows that induce the facet. We also define F¯(T ) to be the set
of all faces contained in facets ofF(T ). To avoid confusion
between row and column vectors, the sets G(S) and G¯(S)
are defined similarly w.r.t. the polytope conv(BS). Then
S ∈ F(T ) iff Alice’s strategies induced by S are all best
responses to some mixed strategy by Bob on the strategy set
induced by T . Note thatS and T induce a Nash equilibrium,
denoted by S↔T , if and only if S ∈ F(T ) and T ∈ G(S).
We denote by EST the event that S↔T , and by χST the
indicator variable for this event. By the independence of
the payoff matrices for Alice and Bob, the probability that
S↔T is exactly the product of the probabilities that S ∈
F(T ) and T ∈ G(S).
We begin with the expected number of d× d Nash equi-
libria.
Lemma 6. The expected number of Nash equilibria in a
random game is
E

 ∑
S,T :|S|=|T |=d
χST

 = (N+d )2.
Proof. Given S let us first evaluate the probability that T ∈
G(S) for some T . We have seen that this is the case only if
BS(T ) induces a useful facet in BS . Thus, this probability
is exactly
N+d(
n
d
) .
Similarly, we also have that
P(S ∈ F(T )) = N
+
d(
n
d
) .
By the independence of the payoff matrices, we obtain
P(S↔T ) =
(
N+
d
(nd)
)2
. Summing up over all pairs, S, T ,
the lemma follows.
Let µ denote the above expectation. We are interested in
the probability that the random variable Z =
∑
S,T
χST >
0. We will use the notation
△ =
∑
(S,T ),(S′,T ′):(S,T )1(S′,T ′)
P(EST ∧ ES′T ′),
where 1 signifies that the events EST and ES′T ′ are depen-
dent. We remark that such a dependency arises if and only
if either S ∩S′ 6= ∅ or T ∩ T ′ 6= ∅. Our interest in △ arises
because, applying standard techniques [2], we obtain:
P(Z = 0) ≤ V ar(Z)
E(Z)2
≤ E(Z) +△
E(Z)2
(2)
The next lemma bounds ∆.
Lemma 7. In a random game
△ . µ2
(
1
n
+
1
(N+1 )
2
)
.
Proof. Let X = S∗ ∩ S and Y = T ∗ ∩ T , s = |X | and
t = |Y |. We remark that only the cardinalities of these in-
tersections will be of consequence. Recall that X ∈ F¯(T ∗)
means that the vertices corresponding to X form a useful
face (i.e., are all best responses) in the game induced by the
strategies of T ∗. So
△ =
∑
s,t
∑
(S,T ),(S∗,T∗):
|X|=s,|Y |=t
P(S↔T and S∗↔T ∗)
=
∑
s,t
∑
(S,T ),(S∗,T∗):
|X|=s,|Y |=t
[P(S ∈ F(T ) and S∗ ∈ F(T ∗))
×P(T ∈ G(S) and T ∗ ∈ G(S∗)))
= 2
∑
s≥1
∑
(S,T ),(S∗,T∗):
|X|=s,|Y |=0
[P(S ∈ F(T ) and S∗ ∈ F(T ∗))
×P(T ∈ G(S) and T ∗ ∈ G(S∗))]
+
∑
s,t≥1
∑
(S,T ),(S∗,T∗):
|X|=s,|Y |=t
[P(S ∈ F(T ) and S∗ ∈ F(T ∗))
×P(T ∈ G(S) and T ∗ ∈ G(S∗))]
= 2△1 +△2.
The following claims will be useful in bounding these
terms.
Claim 1. For n sufficiently larger than d, if T ∩ T ∗ = 0
then
P(T ∈ G(S) ∧ T ∗ ∈ G(S∗)) .
(
N+d(
n
d
)
)2
Proof. Let G−T (S∗) be the set of useful facets of the poly-
tope induced by the rows of S∗ if we ignore the d points
corresponding to the columns of T ; define G−T∗(S) simi-
larly. Then clearly
P(T ∈ G(S) ∧ T ∗ ∈ G(S∗))
≤ P(T ∈ G−T∗(S) ∧ T ∗ ∈ G−T (S∗))
= P(T ∈ G−T∗(S)|T ∗ ∈ G−T (S∗))P(T ∗ ∈ G−T (S∗))
But P(T ∈ G−T∗(S)|T ∗ ∈ G−T (S∗)) is maximised
when S = S∗. The result then follows from Lemma 3.
Similarly, applying Lemma 4, or Lemma 5, we obtain
Claim 2. For n sufficiently larger than d,
P(T ∈ G(S) and T ∗ ∈ G(S∗)) . (N
+
d )
2
(
n
t
)
(
n
d
)2
N+t
We are now ready to complete the proof of Lemma 7.
First we bound △1 from above. Observe that since t = 0
the events S ∈ F(T ) and S∗ ∈ G(T ∗) are independent.
Therefore,
P(S ∈ F(T ) and S∗ ∈ F(T ∗)) = P(S ∈ F(T ))2
=
(
N+d(
n
d
)
)2
Applying Claim 1 we have
△1 =
∑
s≥1
∑
(S,T ),(S∗,T∗):
|X|=s,|Y |=0
[P(S ∈ F(T ) and S∗ ∈ F(T ∗))
×P(T ∈ G(S) and T ∗ ∈ G(S∗))]
.
∑
s≥1
∑
(S,T ),(S∗,T∗):
|X|=s,|Y |=0
(N+d )
4(
n
d
)4
However,
(N+d )
4(
n
d
)4 ∑
s:d≥s≥1
∑
(S,T ),(S∗,T∗):
|X|=s,|Y |=0
1
=
µ2(
n
d
)4 ∑
s:d≥s≥1
(
n
d
)(
d
s
)(
n− d
d− s
)(
n
d
)(
n− d
d
)
.
µ2
n
Thus,
△1 . µ
2
n
Next, we work towards bounding △2. Applying Claim
2, we obtain
△2 =
∑
s,t≥1
∑
(S,T ),(S∗,T∗):
|X|=s,|Y |=t
[P(S ∈ F(T ) and S∗ ∈ F(T ∗))
×P(T ∈ G(S) and T ∗ ∈ G(S∗))]
.
∑
s,t≥1
∑
(S,T ),(S∗,T∗):
|X|=s,|Y |=t
(N+d )
4
(
n
s
)(
n
t
)
(
n
d
)4
N+s N
+
t
Now we have
µ2
∑
s,t≥1
(
d
s
)(
d
t
)
N+s N
+
t
.
µ2
(N+1 )
2
Thus
△2 . µ
2
(N+1 )
2
and this completes the proof of Lemma 7.
Theorem 1 now follows from (2) and Lemma 7. Then,
by Theorems 2 and 3, which imply that N+1 becomes much
larger than f(d) as n increases, we obtain our result for ran-
dom games in which the payoff entries are either uniformly
or Normally distributed. In fact, it is enough to look for
2× 2 equilibria.
It follows that the run time of the algorithm is
O(m2n log logn + n2m log logm), with high probability.
To see this observe that we need to calculate the con-
vex hull of n points for each pair of strategies of Alice,
and calculate the convex hull of m points for each pair of
strategies of Bob. Since we can find the convex hull of k
points in 2 dimensions in time O(k log h), where h is the
number of points on the convex hull [21], this takes time
O(m2n log logn + n2m log logm). If a pair of strategies
for Alice and a pair of strategies for Bob mutually induce
facets with non-negative normals in the convex hull associ-
ated with the other pair then we have a Nash equilibrium.
The normals to these facets also give the probability distri-
butions on the strategy supports (at the Nash equilibrium).
Thus our algorithm is entirely combinatorial.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have show that finding equilibria on average is easy.
This raises several questions: (i) Can we extend the analysis
to more general distributions? Our result is unaffected by
linear transformations of the payoff matrices. So, for exam-
ple, each matrix can be chosen from an arbitrary Gaussian.
(ii) Does our algorithm have polynomial expected running
time? (iii) We crucially use the fact that the mean of each
entry is zero. Is this necessary? An algorithm that works
for Gaussian entries with arbitrary means (and time poly-
nomial in the largest variance), akin to smoothed analysis
[35], would give a polynomial-time randomized algorithm
for finding approximate Nash equilibria in arbitrary games
[19]: add random Gaussians to the entries of the given pay-
off matrices; an equilibrium of the perturbed game will be
an approximate equilibrium of the original game with high
probability, given that the variance of the Gaussians is small
enough. The current best algorithm for finding approximate
equilibria has quasi-polynomial complexity [22].
Finally, we observe that finding approximate equilibria
in random games is quite easy: for both the distributions
we consider, with high probability there will be many pure
strategy approximate equilibria and hence one of them can
be found in sublinear time.
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